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Abstract—Fully automated vehicles will require new 
functionalities for perception, navigation and decision making – an 
Autonomous Driving Intelligence (ADI). We consider architectural 
cases for such functionalities and investigate how they integrate 
with legacy platforms. The cases range from a robot replacing the 
driver – with entire reuse of existing vehicle platforms, to a clean-
slate design. Focusing on Heavy Commercial Vehicles (HCVs), we 
assess these cases from the perspectives of business, safety, 
dependability, verification, and realization.  
The original contributions of this paper are the classification of 
the architectural cases themselves and the analysis that follows. 
The analysis reveals that although full reuse of vehicle platforms is 
appealing, it will require explicitly dealing with the accidental 
complexity of the legacy platforms, including adding corresponding 
diagnostics and error handling to the ADI. The current fail-safe 
design of the platform will also tend to limit availability. Allowing 
changes to the platforms, will enable more optimized designs and 
fault-operational behaviour, but will require initial higher 
development cost and specific emphasis on partitioning and control 
to limit the influences of safety requirements. For all cases, the 
design and verification of the ADI will pose a grand challenge and 
relate to the evolution of the regulatory framework including safety 
standards. 
Index Terms—automotive, commercial vehicles, autonomy, full  
automation, SAE L5, HGV, heavy vehicles, modularity, platform 
migration, architecture, functional safety, dependability, 
verification, variability, ISO 26262  
I.  INTRODUCTION  
While autonomous machines are not new, the current strong 
momentum for autonomous mass-produced vehicles is expected 
to have broad socio-technical implications, relating to e.g. tech-
nology, safety, traffic efficiency, liability, insurances, user-
acceptance, legislation 1 , and business models 2 . As a conse-
quence, a multitude of stakeholders are already engaging in 
these issues; new entrants like Alphabet Inc. and established 
Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) like Volvo Car 
Group have demonstrated prototypes of highly automated vehi-
cles [1]. 
 
1 The Vienna convention currently mandates a human driver in the vehicle 
[33]. Changes have recently been proposed but not approved. 
2  The authors have attempted to categorize sociotechnical factors of 
Autonomy [32]. 
To reason about autonomy, several organizations have been 
defining levels of automation, e.g. referring to the wide span of 
potential settings for autonomous operation such as in different 
environments and more or less independent of the driver. The 
Society for Automotive Engineers (SAE) has led one such effort 
[2]. Their levels of automation range from L0 with no automa-
tion and where the driver is responsible for every situation, to 
L53 (highest), which requires the vehicle to handle any situation 
without human fallback in ‘all driving modes’ [2]. These levels 
refer only to capabilities of the vehicle as a whole and are ag-
nostic to implementation details. Modern vehicles already have 
features that take over control from a human e.g. emergency 
braking for heavy vehicles, legally mandated in the European 
Union [3]. However, these features do not correspond to the L5 
level of automation, because they do not contain the ability to 
take appropriate decisions under ‘all driving modes’. 
Concerns such as business and safety will also heavily influ-
ence the choices of architectural strategies for autonomous 
HCVs. Modern vehicles already have Advanced Driver Assis-
tance Systems (ADAS), which can be seen as steps towards 
autonomy. To remain competitive, an OEM must identify how 
much of their previous work can be reused effectively and in 
which way. The question of how the function of autonomy 
should be added to their existing product lines thus becomes 
essential. In this paper, we focus on HCVs and their architecting 
challenges w.r.t. achieving L5 level of automation. We analyze 
how existing platforms, in use by the OEMs, will be affected by 
the introduction of autonomy. 
The contributions from, and organization of, the paper are as 
follows; Section II provides the problem statement. In Section 
III, as a first contribution, we elaborate five architectural cases 
that describe a span of representative solutions. As a second 
contribution, Section IV proceeds with an assessment and com-
parison of the cases w.r.t. business, safety, dependability, verifi-
cation and realization concerns. As a third contribution, we pro-
vide a follow-up discussion in Section V to identify commonali-
ties, tensions among the perspectives as well as overall pros and 
cons of the architectural cases. We finish in Section VI by 
providing conclusions and discussing future work.  
 
3 Autonomy and fully automated driving are terms used interchangeably in 
this paper, referring to the SAE standard of L5 driving automation. 
II. THE PROBLEM DEFINITION 
A. Problem statement  
Though the first L4 automated vehicles are expected to 
reach the market around 2020 [4], as of spring 2016 there are 
not clear standards for assuring their functional safety. Although 
not explicitly referring to autonomy, the functional safety stand-
ard ISO 26262 [5], represents the State Of The Art for the indus-
try for passenger cars. The next revision of the standard, due in 
2018 [6], is expected to apply to HCVs as well. The interpreta-
tion of the standard for autonomous operation is currently wide-
ly debated [7].  However as it is the most relevant standard of 
today for the automotive industry, this paper will use ISO26262 
as a guideline in judging safety related implications. 
To define how an L5 vehicle achieves its capabilities we use 
the ‘Observe, Orient, Decide and Act’ (OODA) loop [8] as a 
reference and distinguish between two major parts of the vehic-
ular system i.e. the ADI and the platform. The ADI is defined 
here to correspond to the ‘Orient’ and ‘Decide’ parts of the 
OODA loop. The ‘Observe’ and ‘Act’ parts map to both the plat-
form and the ADI since either can contain sensors, and high-
level actuation goals are always under the ADI’s control. A plat-
form is defined here as the set of components that provide Elec-
trical/Electronic (E/E) functionality for a vehicle including (but 
not limited to) hardware and associated low-level control. Com-
ponents include physical parts such as ECUs, sensors and actua-
tors; and functional components with which we refer to individ-
ual software components and logical aggregation of these com-
ponents into functions.  
A legacy platform is a platform that is available to an OEM 
and is currently in use by the OEM for achieving lower levels of 
automation. It has evolved within the organization over time due 
to incremental function growth. Typically tailored to an OEM’s 
specific business model, it has seen heavy investments over 
time. It eliminates the need for redevelopment of core functions 
and arguably enables existing OEMs to leverage their domain 
knowledge more effectively. The legacy platform is likely to 
have followed the common automotive trends and evolved as a 
largely federated architecture; this means that while functions 
may be distributed across multiple ECUs, during the evolution 
of the platform, there has been a grouping and isolation of relat-
ed functionality e.g. using subnetworks [9]. 
Brooks distinguishes between essential complexity i.e. com-
plexity that arises from realizing product requirements which  
cannot be designed out of a system, and accidental complexity 
which is possible to be identified and removed from a system by 
better design [10]. An example of accidental complexity is the 
incremental growth within legacy platforms that may have 
caused multiple dependencies between functions. For an exist-
ing OEM, or a new entrant collaborating with one, a key ques-
tion that needs to be addressed is how to add the ADI in the 
most economical way, with the minimum of accidental com-
plexity, while ensuring adequate safety and dependability. We 
thus pose the following question: What are the implications of 
the ways that the ADI can be coupled with legacy platforms? 
We address this question by (1) stipulating a representative 
range of architectural scenarios of how the ADI and vehicle 
platform can interplay, ranging from a strict add-on (platform is 
reused entirely as a whole), to a ‘clean-slate’ design (the legacy 
platform is entirely unchanged), and (2) assessing the architec-
tural solutions through the perspectives of business, safety, de-
pendability, verification and realization.  
The particular set of perspectives selected for this paper was 
selected based on experiences and investigations of the state of 
the art [11]. 
B. Related work 
 To the best of our knowledge, the classification of the 
interactions between the ADI for L5 vehicles and legacy 
platforms is novel. In this light, the discussion along chosen 
perspectives (business, safety, dependability etc.) also becomes 
an original contribution. There is however, a lot of related work 
on autonomous systems architectures and on specific 
perspectives such as safety. We provide a brief review of such 
work here. 
      Several publications describe prototype autonomous 
vehicles including e.g. the architecture of ‘Bertha’, the 
Mercedes Benz S-class vehicle [12], the European HAVE-IT 
project [13] ,  Stanford University's DARPA Urban Challenge 
entry ‘Junior’ [14] and the A1 car, which won the ‘Autonomous 
vehicle Competition’, organized by Hyundai motors in 2010 
[15]. These vehicles are designed by adding an ADI to an 
existing vehicle, with automation levels corresponding to L2 or 
L3, meaning that there is always a human available to take over 
if needed. The presence of a human adds a layer of safety and 
consequently, nearly all of these publications focus on the 
structure or design of the ADI and deal with the platform only as 
a tool to achieve the functionality needed. While it is feasible to 
do so for a prototype vehicle, it is not for a commercially sold, 
series produced L5 vehicle since extra functional aspects such 
as safety and dependability have to be designed into a platform 
and verified in a way that stays in line with the OEMs business 
model, acceptable safety praxis and within a reasonable cost.   
      Methodologies and reference architecture for vehicle control 
system design have been proposed, e.g. by Gordon et al [16] 
and Behere and Törngren [17]. These methodologies include 
recommendations for layering for hierarchical control of various 
functionalities, and also compare and relate to well-known 
architecture control system patterns such as the subsumption 
architecture, NASREM [18] and 4D-RCS [19]. 
     The design of novel architectures has received general 
attention e.g. for fault-tolerant control systems [20]; an example 
of an adaption of an existing platform to increase reliability and 
availability is described in [21], where inherent redundancy and 
reconfiguration is utilized. 
    Safety and in particular controllability for autonomous 
vehicles has received a lot of attention in recent times [22] [23]. 
The automotive industry commonly now appears to take the 
standpoint that controllability would be set to its worst level 
resulting in higher Automotive Safety Integrity Levels (ASILs).  
III. REPRESENTATIVE ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN APPROACHES  
Due to the broad field that this paper covers, some assump-
tions and delimitations are used to scope and structure the dis-
cussion. Issues that deal with the vehicle as a whole i.e. are 
common to all the different cases e.g., details on how the ADI is 
structured or modularized internally, are not explicitly dis-
cussed. Similarly, issues dealing with communication and col-
laboration with vehicle-external entities are out of scope.  
Figure 1 shows the idealized control topology of a legacy 
platform. It is modelled as having hierarchical layers of func-
tions, such that functions at the higher layers directly control 
functions in the layers beneath them. Arbitration is used by 
functions at the lower layers to resolve multiple control com-
mands. The lowest control layer, the Single Actuator Control 
Layer (SACL) controls only a single actuator system. One or 
more of SACL functions are controlled together by the functions 
at the Vehicle Motion Control Layer (VMCL). The Coordinated 
Control Layer (CCL) in turn controls one or more functions of 
the VMCL or below. The choice of separating the CCL and the 
VMCL was made to distinguish between the characteristics of 
the sensory inputs available. The CCL consists of functions like 
ADAS and has access to sensors that observe the environment 
e.g. cameras, radars, GPS etc., while the VMCL typically has 
access only to sensors related to the vehicle itself such as vehi-
cle speed sensors, temperature sensors etc. This representation 
helps anchor the discussions without getting lost in implementa-
tion details and reflects upon the principles of how incremental 
changes have traditionally been incorporated by OEMs. 
As an example, within this representation the Adaptive 
Cruise Control functionality would exist at the CCL and use 
sensors that observe the environment, such as radar, as input in 
addition to sensory data from the lower layers. It uses the ser-
vices of the Cruise Controller at the VMCL, which in turn uses 
sensors that observe the vehicle itself, such as wheel speed sen-
sors, and commands SACL layer functions such as the brake 
and engine systems. 
Many solutions are possible for how the ADI can interact 
with the legacy platform. The metric of reusability is applied to 
filter out cases of interest from amongst these. The ISO 26262 
standard distinguishes between the safety-related activities of a 
new development and a modification of an existing item [5]; an 
entirely new development generally has a higher need for safety 
related activities than a modified component. To limit the extent 
of the safety related activities and the associated costs on the 
legacy components because of the ADI’s influence; we impose a 
restriction that a component from a legacy platform can only be 
reused by the ADI if its new usage has not changed from its 
initial design specification. To comply with this restriction, the 
usage of the component by the ADI will only be allowed via the 
existing interfaces and the ADI will meet both the data and tim-
ing requirements of the component set during the component’s 
design. This restriction on the reuse of legacy components also 
implies that new sensors needed by the ADI are added directly 
to it, and the legacy platform is unchanged. It is also assumed 
that any component that is part of the legacy platform is mature, 
safe and reliable. Using the scope set by the delimitations above, 
we arrive at five representative architectural cases chosen for 
assessment based on how much of the legacy platform can be 
reused. The cases show a gradual decreasing reliance on the 
platform by the ADI as it interfaces with progressively lower 
layers, allowing for more of the components in the legacy plat-
form to be changed or removed. 
 
Case 1. Robotic ADI 
     The ADI in this solution is a robot present in the driver seat 
that is capable of controlling the vehicle in the same way as a 
human. It uses the same interfaces as a human such as the accel-
erator and brake pedals, infotainment system etc. There is no 
electrical connection between the vehicle and the robot. 
 
Case 2. Electrical ADI interface 
This solution is characterized by the E/E interfacing of the ADI 
to the CCL. The ADI is capable of controlling the vehicle 
through similar platform functions as available to a driver. The 
ADI is allowed to access the VMCL layer or below only if the 
driver had the same access before.  
  
Case 3. Deep ADI-platform integration 
A deeper point of interface into the platform by the ADI 
characterizes this solution. The ADI has the ability to bypass the 
CCL layer to access functions at the VMCL, for higher granu-
larity in operation. If needed, CCL functions may be disabled. 
The ADI cannot control functions at the SACL.  
 
Case 4. Distributed platform ADI  
Co-Ordinated Control Layer 
(CCL)
Vehicle Motion Control Layer 
(VMCL)
Single actuator Control Layer 
(SACL)
Hardware actuation control, Sensors, 
Actuators
ADI
Platform
Legend
Case 2
Case 3
Communication already 
existing in the platform
GroupingFunctional components
Distributed 
controllers(Case 4)
ADI / central coordinating 
component
 Figure 1: The layered platform with the cases 
 
    This approach encourages the use of legacy platform compo-
nents as much as possible but allows for the redefinition or re-
calibration of the components as needed by the ADI. The ADI 
can be distributed into the platform. An example of such a rede-
sign would be a hierarchical distributed set of semi-autonomous 
nodes with a central controlling node at the apex only responsi-
ble for goals at a vehicle level. Each tier in the hierarchy, (1) 
refines the command it receives for the lower tiers or legacy 
components and (2) filters out information it receives from the 
lower tiers or legacy components and reports only what is essen-
tial for the tiers above.  
 
Case 5. ‘Clean-slate design’ approach.  
This approach deals with the design of the entire vehicle in-
cluding the platform from scratch such that autonomy is part of 
the design goals from the beginning. Detailed analysis of this 
approach will be limited as the absence of the legacy platform 
also implies that this case could materialize into any of the other 
cases. It could also lead to unique solutions that are not achieva-
ble with the other cases. This approach is used as a delimiting 
case for the purposes of this paper. 
 
Cases 1 and 5 are extremes in the range of choices as in the 
former the legacy platform as a whole is used without changes, 
and in the latter, the platform is designed from scratch, allowing 
for the most freedom in terms of choosing technologies and 
components. Cases 2 and 3 differ primarily in the layer at which 
they interface to the platform and consequently the granularity 
of control they exert and information they receive from the leg-
acy platform. The architecture of most of the prototypes de-
scribed in section II.B fall under Cases 2 and 3. The primary 
goal behind cases 1 to 3 is to use as much of the legacy platform 
as possible while the primary goals of case 4 and 5 is to have a 
platform that is optimized for the usage by the ADI. Only Cases 
4 and 5 allow modifications to the platform. 
IV. COMPARISON OF THE VARIOUS APPROACHES AND SOLUTIONS 
A. Business aspects including variability 
An HCV is a transport solution tool for either moving peo-
ple or goods, and is customized to the owners’ specific applica-
tion and their business needs. The need for a high level of appli-
cation specific customization creates a large amount of variabil-
ity for all aspects of the vehicle. Frame dimensions and engine 
power to specific software modules, individual sensors and ac-
tuators and more are subject to customization directly affecting 
all phases of the product lifecycle; and consequently the cost of 
a vehicle. These commonalities and variabilities are also present 
in other development artefacts such as requirements, architec-
ture, verification results etc. [24].  
Though design for all possible configurations of a common 
platform represents a very significant undertaking, there is a 
direct business benefit. HCVs may have a number of different 
owners and applications during its lifetime and be rebuilt to 
meet the different owners’ unique requirements. ‘Re-
buildability’ increases the resale value of the product purely 
based on customization abilities provided by the aftermarket 
[25] and in turn allows the OEM to charge a premium on the 
first sale. The same thinking also applies to designing platforms 
where autonomy is an option. The platform should be able to 
generate both autonomous and non-autonomous variants. 
Cases 1 and 2 open up possibilities for third party providers 
to provide ADIs as independent compatible products, if the 
interfaces are standardized across organizations. There could 
then be competition amongst OEM ADIs and third party ADIs. 
If on the other hand, the interfaces are proprietary, the OEMs 
will need to design the ADI themselves. The split of the 
responsibility of liability between the OEM and the ADI vendor, 
w.r.t. the entire vehicle will be dependent on a combination of 
who provides the ADI, does the integration and the verification. 
Business decisions also have a temporal dimension. A first 
mover advantage into the market may be considered 
strategically important, and some extra costs might be 
acceptable for this purpose. If this were the goal by the OEM, 
Cases 1 through 3 appear appealing since the existing platforms 
could be leveraged and the focus would be on the ADI and its 
platform integration. Needed sensing capabilities could be 
added to the ADI (raising costs) but in principle enabling 
maximal platform reuse. It could even be possible to reach this 
step by outsourcing the autonomy parts to companies from 
industries that have more experience w.r.t. automation, while the 
OEM builds up competence with technologies in this field. 
However, in the long term, Cases 4 and maybe even 5 could be 
preferred over cases 1 to 3 as long as the specific instantiation of 
the solution is flexible enough to generate non-automated 
variants as a subset of its possibilities.  
For any vehicle built from a particular platform, an ECU, 
sensor or software module always has its given physical place. 
In Cases 4 and 5, the whole cabin could be considered superflu-
ous due to the absence of a human driver, and its removal would 
greatly reduce the cost of the bill of materials for every autono-
mous vehicle built. However, to do so, any ECU physically pre-
sent in the cabin area and necessary for autonomous functionali-
ty, would have to move to another location in the vehicle and be 
designed for a much tougher environment. Removing the cabin 
would affect the connectivity to the ECUs, the electrical load 
distribution, and more, implying that such a solution would be 
very different from the platform of today. Furthermore, these 
changes within a single modular platform would mean that non-
autonomous variants of the vehicle would also be affected by 
these substantial changes. Thus, there is a cost to achieving au-
tonomy within a single platform.  
The other alternative would be to maintain different product 
lines for autonomous and non-autonomous variants and com-
promising on ‘re-buildability’. This could  also be used as a 
technique to decrease platform variability; thereby limiting the 
extent of safety analysis and verification efforts to specific 
product lines. There would nevertheless be unavoidable extra 
costs involved to maintain different product lines. 
Which of these alternatives is more preferable, economical 
and achievable is a crucial business decision for the OEM.  
B. Safety 
Safety is a key characteristic for the introduction of any 
potentially disruptive technology; in general, the technology has 
to be evaluated as being at least as safe as previous solutions, or 
risk being rejected by legislators, regulators or users. The 
introduction of autonomy is driven partly by the potential to 
improve accident statistics; traffic statistics from the U.S.A. 
show that the mean time between crashes that cause injuries is 
about 50,000 vehicle hours [26]. For an autonomous vehicle to 
be acceptable in society, it will likely need to be proven 
substantially safer than this human driver baseline. 
HCVs will have an additional set of specific safety require-
ments compared to passenger cars, due to a number of reasons: 
• Their size implies a risk of causing a large amount of 
damage to their surroundings. 
• They can carry cargo, hazardous material, with implica-
tions on safety far beyond their own capabilities. 
• They are currently driven by what the public expects to 
be experts or ‘professional drivers’.  
Current standards such as IEC 61508 [27] and ISO 26262 
[5] which define integrity levels according to risk, would sug-
gest that autonomy related functions should therefore be classi-
fied with the highest integrity levels, e.g. with ASIL D in 
ISO26262. Moreover, there is a risk that existing safety goals 
may be assigned higher ASILs due to the absence of a human 
[21] or the changed operational context.   
Safety-related dependencies among different functions are 
critical to keep track of. This includes cataloguing both direct 
and indirect interactions including e.g. through resource sharing. 
Non-safety functions should be kept independent of safety criti-
cal functions or they will also have to be developed according to 
the same strict requirements. For all the cases, this means that 
the platform has to be handled with strict control so that the 
influence of safety requirements is as limited as possible. The 
ADI in its role as the decision-making entity (defined by its 
roles w.r.t. the OODA loop) in the vehicle, will unless care is 
taken in the architecture (re)design, connect to many function-
alities and parts of the vehicle. From this, it can be deduced that 
the ADI should be modularized in a such a way that highly safe-
ty related parts can be separated from less critical parts as much 
as possible, to limit their influence on the platform. If not con-
trolled, this will cause dependencies and extra associated costs 
that could ultimately make autonomy unfeasible.  
Case 1 provides an interesting option; it promises to leave 
the platform untouched, also w.r.t. safety measures. However, 
there are several implications of Case 1. Firstly, to replace the 
driver, will require additional vehicle behaviour related sensors 
and diagnostics to provide the inputs a driver would have 
(sounds, vibrations, smoke etc.). Such sensors are needed for the 
ADI to take action in case of vehicle errors such as a flat tire 
(recall that no access to the information from the platform is 
possible with case 1). Secondly, the ADI will also have limited 
since the platform is left untouched and since control takes place 
only through the standard driver interfaces and its corresponding 
constraints. Thirdly, the OEMs will only be able to partly lever-
age their extensive domain knowledge (especially related to 
safety) when the aim is to create an autonomous robot driver 
rather than an autonomous vehicle. 
For Cases 2 or 3 to maintain their strict interfaces, any ex-
plicit or implicit interactions between the ADI and functionality 
part of the legacy platform must be foreseen and handled during 
integration testing.  Case 2 will be the most challenging, as the 
paths used by the ADI to the actuating components are the least 
customizable. It will also be necessary for the ADI to have run-
time access to a model of the vehicle including its platform, 
describing various failure modes and symptoms, in order for the 
ADI to take proper safety measures (such as, if possible, transi-
tioning into a safe state).  
The magnitude of the task to classify the functional interac-
tions in detail suggest that ADI should be moved closer to com-
ponents of the legacy platform instead (e.g. Case 4), to control 
the possibilities of interference.  
For all cases, safe states and safe behaviour of the vehicle 
must be identified effectively for various operational scenarios. 
Enabling this in design will impose specific requirements on the 
architecture of the platforms. If the resulting platforms are not 
possible to adapt, or if the complexity cannot be managed, it 
would be required to start over from scratch. Case 5 might thus 
be better, or even required, to stay competitive in the long run.  
C. Dependability and security 
As a transport tool, a loss of service from an HCV could 
mean significant economic losses for the owner. Hence, de-
pendability becomes a serious concern. Assuming that in the 
design of legacy components, reliance was placed on the driver 
to detect abnormal behaviours, replacing the driver will imply a 
greater need to detect failures effectively.  
With the complexity introduced by autonomy, a resulting 
decrease in reliability is inevitable. An argument against Case 1 
is that the mechanical components of the robot and the addition-
al sensors introduce more parts than compared to Cases 2 to 4.  
Current automotive functionalities are typically designed to 
be fail-safe e.g. active safety functions shut down as soon as a 
potential fault is discovered. To keep the same reliability and 
availability as a non-autonomous vehicle, the ADI will instead 
probably need to be fail-operational for faults in the both the 
ADI and the platform. To do so, it will need to know not only 
that a failure has occurred, but also details of the failure itself 
i.e. specific details from the platform allowing it to exploit the 
inherent redundancies in the platform, as exemplified in [21].  
However, the implicit dependencies (models of the platform in 
ADI, diagnostics of the platform performed by the ADI) will 
probably require an increase in the complexity of the ADI-
platform interface to enable well-defined autonomous driving, 
potentially requiring more changes than Cases 1 to 3 allow. 
Thus while it is nearly impossible to avoid a fail-safe mode of 
operation w.r.t. errors in the platform as in Cases 1 to 3, Case 4  
allows for fail-operational design.  
Reliability and availability are usually achieved by means of 
part quality, fault-tolerance, robustness, and ease of repair. Due 
to the implications of the loss of service for an HCV, degraded 
modes have to be precisely identified per use case and fault tol-
erance becomes a necessity. Operation in the degraded modes 
has to be then ensured, with appropriate error detection mecha-
nisms and highly reliable design for critical subsystems. Once 
the system has failed and transitions to degraded mode, the 
speed and ease of repair (maintainability) becomes essential. 
This needs a thorough understanding of the in-vehicle E/E sys-
tems and excellent diagnostic and troubleshooting capabilities. 
None of the present approaches to diagnostics however, to our 
knowledge, takes the complexity increase due to autonomy into 
account. Meeting these needs without the ability to change the 
legacy platform, such as in cases 1 to 3, will be a substantial 
challenge. 
Though this section has focused so far on non-malicious is-
sues, it should be noted that reliability could also be affected by 
a lack of emphasis on security. While Case 1 is the least affected 
by the vulnerabilities in the platform, Cases 2 to 4 expose pro-
gressively higher attack surfaces (as defined in [28]) to the 
world as the ADI is susceptible to influence by more elements 
of the platform.  
To summarize, the aspects of dependability are multidimen-
sional, and should be taken into consideration from early in the 
system design phase. The dependability targets will be challeng-
ing to achieve with the additional complexity of autonomy. To 
effectively address this issue and keep the same dependability 
levels as the legacy platform, as much flexibility as possible in 
the redesign of the platform, is desired.  
D. Verification 
Challenges arise for verification from the impact of safety 
and dependability. Current standards for safety, implicitly point 
to an increase in the rigor of needed testing e.g. due to higher 
ASILs. The introduction of redundancy including potentially 
higher fault tolerance, the essential complexity of autonomy, 
and the accidental complexity of legacy platforms further in-
crease the scope of what has to be tested with this rigor.  
As mentioned in the safety perspective, specific emphasis 
will have to be placed on integration testing to cover the interac-
tions between the ADI and the platform. Compartmentalization 
and limiting potential feature interaction will be of special rele-
vance for Cases 2, 3 and 4. Architecture related verification 
could be simplified for Case 4 and, especially, Case 5 assuming 
proper architecture design. 
Comparing Cases 1 through 3, Case 1 poses a challenge in 
that the robot driver has to be proven at least as skilled as that of 
an expert human driver w.r.t. an asynchronously updated plat-
form; this involves dealing with the interactions through the 
existing mechanical and visual interfaces. Cases 2 and 3 could 
imply a relatively (compared to case 1) simpler electronic inter-
face for command propagation between the ADI and the plat-
form enabling partial separation of the verification efforts.  
For Cases 1 through 3, achieving a fail-safe behaviour by the 
ADI in all cases, if it is even possible, will require additional 
verification efforts; there will most likely be an associated, large 
increase in (a) the number of environments and use cases han-
dled during verification, and (b) the efforts to achieve traceabil-
ity between system modes and verification evidence. For Cases 
4 and 5, in addition, any reconfiguration or fault-tolerance 
measures will require specific verification efforts. 
High safety-related rigor is already quite difficult to achieve 
within existing functionality in legacy platforms. This is partly 
due to the lack of a methodology for systematic and efficient 
verification of such complex systems [29]. It has been 
frequently suggested that verification techniques have to be 
updated, e.g. through the adoption of tool supported traceability 
and formal verification [30]. However, to achieve cost 
efficiency, formal verification normally needs to be limited to 
critical parts of the system. 
 To limit verification activities, architectures that provide 
composability will be very important. This ultimately points 
towards Case 5 as the best option. In all cases, modularization of 
the ADI, regardless of its decentralization, will be very im-
portant to facilitate the verification of the ADI. 
E. Realization  
The architecture of a system is developed based on both 
functional and extra-functional needs, and is used as an enabler 
to resolve conflicts between such needs and minimize the acci-
dental complexity of the system. The goals for designing of the 
architecture are also heavily influenced by the development 
process and, the structure and culture of the organization.  
Automotive organizations have built their E/E systems from 
the bottom up. Isolation of related functionality from the rest of 
the system using e.g. subnetworks, has been a traditional way to 
keep chances of unintended interactions in check. This has also 
helped in efficient utilization of the limited bandwidth provided 
by the Controller Area Network (CAN). As such, a large part of 
the data available to functions on lower layers of the platform is 
not usually available on the vehicle wide CAN network. 
As described in the dependability section, in the absence of 
possibilities to change the platform (Cases 1 to 3) there will be a 
need to compensate with supervisory functions to detect fail-
ures. Hence, in all the cases, the ADI will need to get infor-
mation about the state of the vehicle from the platform. Case 1, 
where informational flow from the platform is not possible, be-
comes considerably harder to realize. Cases 2 and 3 will also be 
adversely affected owing to the lack of detail in the information 
at the CCL and VMCL layers. A theoretic possibility to com-
pensate would be for the ADI to be physically connected to 
lower layers into any subnetwork or sensors of use, and read the 
information required. Practically however, this would result in 
severe cabling and packaging issues as the number of connec-
tions increase with increasing need for more detailed infor-
mation.  
There are two issues relating to the needed information flow, 
(1) the identification of the relevant parameters would need to 
be performed relatively early during the design, and (2) the 
bandwidth needed for transmission of this information may 
stretch the capabilities of the existing network topology. If not 
tightly controlled, it could lead to a need to redesign of the en-
tire existing vehicle wide networks. It is thus of high importance 
to control and limit the implications of the information flow 
between the ADI and the platform. From a realization perspec-
tive, it makes sense to instead move the ADI closer to (or into) 
the platform components to filter and limit this information flow 
as much as possible as suggested by Case 4. 
The dependability and the safety sections highlight the need 
to modularize the ADI. OEMs have traditionally had an organi-
zational hierarchy that groups resources by their domain exper-
tise. In Cases 1 to 3, from an organizational perspective, the 
ADI would likely be separate from those who develop the plat-
form. This would lead to some overlap of responsibilities be-
tween those developing the ADI via a platform abstraction, and 
those working directly with the platform and consequently, op-
erational inefficiencies.  
Cases 1 to 3 on closer inspection do not seem to provide the 
clean divide between the ADI and the legacy platform that they 
were originally intended for. Case 4 follows trends already in 
place like grouping domain knowledge together in terms of en-
gineering resources, and increasing the reliance put on those 
who work in the respective domains. Thus, if Case 5 is not an 
option due to the business aspects such as resource or cost is-
sues, from a technical feasibility perspective, Case 4 appears to 
be the most promising.  
V. DISCUSSION 
In this section, we reflect on the perspectives provided to the 
architectural cases. We structure the discussion into topics rele-
vant for all cases, topics relating to cases 1-3 which aim at pre-
serving backward compatibility in the platform and minimizing 
changes, and topics relating to cases 4-5 which take a more 
pragmatic approach and aim for optimization w.r.t. autonomy.  
A. Similarities and relations between the perspectives. 
This paper focusses on HCVs, pointing to specific consider-
ations such as safety and aspects for commercial transport. 
However, many of the findings from the perspectives, such as 
the essential complexity of full automation, also apply to pas-
senger cars.  
New functionality is worked into existing platforms every 
day. The difference between incrementally adding functions, 
e.g. to fulfil a new regulation, and that of autonomy include: (i) 
the drastic increase in essential complexity (ii) the wide range of 
socio technical implications that arise due to the potentially dis-
ruptive nature of autonomy and (iii) the absence of a driver to 
deal with unexpected failures. 
The safety and verification perspectives recommend the 
modularization of the ADI to limit the spread of influence of 
safety critical requirements and rigor of testing respectively. A 
need to identify the safe states and the degraded modes of the 
vehicle precisely was noted with the safety and dependability 
perspectives. Due to the range of scenarios possible, such identi-
fication becomes critical to exhaustively verify that the vehicle 
is able to transition into a safe or a degraded state. 
Care must be taken to handle the trade-offs between safety 
and availability. The ADI needs to provide high availability, at 
least in the order of what current platforms do and most likely 
higher, especially for HCVs. Redundancy will be required for 
safety and also for dependability, e.g. in terms of sensors, diag-
nostics etc. Designing and verifying such functionality poses 
several challenges; the ADI has to be robust and reliable while 
being perceived as safe.  
B. Cases 1-3 
To achieve the same capabilities as a skilled human driver to 
deal with hazardous situations (puncture, fires, …) the ADI will 
for cases 1 through 3 need specific sensors (sound, vibrations, 
etc.). A thorough understanding of the platform, including sens-
ing, diagnostics and models, will be crucial in order for the ADI 
to take appropriate actions. In all these cases, a platform abstrac-
tion and interface will be needed. 
Cases 1 through 3 will cause higher accidental complexity 
for several reasons. The platforms have been evolving in a bot-
tom-up fashion for many years, and have many dependencies 
across the functions and complex arbitration in-between them. 
Adding the ADI on top will require special care to avoid feature 
interactions with the existing platform functions. The ADI will 
moreover be limited by, and have to consider, existing diagnos-
tics and error handling functions in the platform.  
Finally, we note that the ADI will not be able to rely on the 
presence of platform control functions such as cruise control or 
emergency braking, since these are designed to be fail-silent. 
Optionally, the ADI could make use of them but must then also 
be able to detect when they fail and shift to direct brake and 
throttle control. This could mean that Case 2 is not feasible due 
to its limitations. Hence, of these three solutions Case 3 appears 
to be the most viable, albeit from the short-term perspective. 
C. Cases 4-5 
The legacy platform is designed for manual driving. It 
would be unlikely that the same platform was ideal to accom-
modate autonomy, where no consideration of the human user 
needs or expectations need to be accounted for in the design. 
A strong argument for cases 4 and 5 is the possibility to min-
imize the accidental complexity. These cases may also be able to 
provide a stricter separation of functionalities of different criti-
cality, thereby facilitating verification and providing cost-
efficient safety. This would however require very careful de-
signs, and a large initial cost. Case 4 is also, in the short term, 
most likely to increase the variability in the platform and have 
significant implications for verification and cost.  
It must be noted, that even in Case 5, many components at 
the lowest layers would be reused to save costs. The choices 
between Case 4 and Case 5 essentially boil down to the problem 
of what is better for the organization in question; to start with a 
legacy platform and successively optimize it to achieve autono-
my, or to start with a clean-slate and successively add compo-
nents to achieve autonomy.  
Case 4 allows the platform to continue generating non-
autonomous variants while evolving towards autonomy and 
spreads the cost of achieving autonomy over a longer period. 
Case 5 for an established OEM, involves the maintenance of  
two different platforms, at least until the new platform is stable 
and modular enough to support all the non-autonomous variants 
that its predecessor supported (and probably till the end of the 
lifetime of the last vehicle of the previous platform).  
An interesting question for cases 4 and 5 is what the inter-
face between the compartmentalized ADI and the (new) plat-
form would look like in terms of the information flow. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The conclusion arrived at from this paper is that though so-
lutions like Cases 1 to 3 with a strict separation of the ADI ap-
pear appealing at first glance; they have a hidden complexity 
that could make them unsuitable for achieving a functionally 
safe, fully automated product. A deeper integration between the 
ADI and the platform, possible only in Cases 4 and 5, will be 
unavoidable in the long run. 
A series of workshops have been planned with the help of 
‘Innovative Center for Embedded Systems’ (ICES) at KTH 
within the taskforce of ‘Autonomous Systems Architectures and 
Platforms’ (ASAP) industrial competence group, to refine and 
validate the cases, and the findings from the perspectives. Case 
studies will be conducted at Scania CV and using the Grand 
Cooperative Driving Challenge [31] competition for validation. 
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